Puntland News1

The international community has attempted to assist Somalia through a series of conferences, reports and intervention by the UN. None of these initiatives have succeeded, mainly because there is a widespread lack of understanding of the roots of the problems in this country. It is essential to see the recent civil war and the breakdown of the state in the context of Somalia’s turbulent history and its nomadic culture.

The Somalis are largely nomadic, roaming throughout the Horn of Africa. They live in small, temporary hamlets that are dismantled and loaded on to camels for quick and easy migration. Because of this nomadic way of life, social units tend to be small and self-sufficient. This style of life has created a people that have been described as "independent in nature, temperamental and strikingly intelligent."

Roughly 80% of the Somali population is "pastoral nomadic" and only 20% can be described as urban agricultural. The social and economic life of Somalia is therefore defined by a nomadic, rural style of life with trade consisting mainly of agricultural products. Over many years there has been a continuous movement of the population from the rural areas to the big urban centers in the south like Mogadishu, where there is a now large permanent urban population, mostly dependant on agriculture.

At the end of nineteenth century, the area was partitioned between the European colonial powers and Ethiopia. The Somali peninsula, one of the most culturally homogeneous regions of Africa, was divided into British Somaliland, French Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, Ethiopian Somaliland (the Ogaden), and what came to be called the Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya.

The regime used Somalia’s geographically strategic location in the Horn of Africa to attract funds from the superpowers during the cold war and is said to have attracted one of the highest amounts of per capita foreign aid in the world between 1960 and 1990. By the mid-1970s, Somalia had also one of Africa’s largest standing armies, and spent from 40% to 50% of its budget on defense and security.

In 1988, aid from the West was frozen following a series of reports of genocide and human rights violations. Within two years the regime collapsed, marking the end of the Somali state. This was followed by a seven-year period of violent warfare and banditry throughout the country. Siyad Barre’s manipulation of clans had created an atmosphere of mistrust and hostility that gradually weakened both the traditional and the national institutions. So when the government collapsed in January 1991, the institutions were not solid enough to prevent the whole country from disintegrating.

Mogadishu, the nation's capital, was specially affected by the collapse of law and order. The problem was that the nation's assets were overwhelmingly concentrated in the city. It was estimated that over 90% of the national assets, the only functioning government departments, 50-60% of the nation’s population, and dozens or even hundreds of well-stocked army barracks with huge ammunition depots were concentrated in Mogadishu alone. In other words, Somalia was a nation with one vital element and when Mogadishu collapsed, Somalia immediately ceased to be a nation.

During the civil war Mogadishu experienced irreparable physical damages The city was destroyed beyond recognition, and much of its physical beauty is lost forever. All the official records it once housed were also destroyed or lost. The city became a graveyard for thousands of Somalis and home to thousands of others maimed by the violent civil war that raged in the city for 10 years. Mogadishu is also the hub of an area once described by UN General Secretary, Kofi Annan, as "a black hole of anarchy" where gangs call the shots.

After the defeat of the government forces in January 1991, the victorious militias turned their guns on the innocent civilian population of Mogadishu and its environs, specifically targeting the non-Hawiye clans. Rampaging militias indiscriminately massacred innocent civilians. An unprecedented level of humanitarian abuse including mass rape, torture and killing was also reported. Thousands lost their lives and hundreds of thousands were forced to flee their homes. Many former residents of Mogadishu have now lost hope of ever returning to their homes and have opted to go back to their 'clan home bases' to rebuild their lives.

What does the future hold for Somalia? In the best case scenario, the country will be de-centralized into smaller manageable units. Each unit will need to develop its own economic base and modern institutions, including all levels of education, to allow it to exist as viable entity. For instance, it should not be necessary to travel hundreds of kilometers to Mogadishu to have access to an international telephone call or to renew a passport. If Somalia evolves in this way it will also be able to tap the potential resources of the country more efficiently. The sum of the decentralized units will make up a strong nation with many functioning elements.

A study group commissioned by the EU with the assistance of the UN Development Office also concluded in its study - A study of Decentralized Political Structure for Somalia 1995 - that the country should be de-centralized into "a federal or confederate or even into decentralized unitary state." The study also concluded that the "bottom up approach," which essentially means the building of political structures in which full participation of the civil society is ensured, was the only viable option for the reconstitution of Somalia as a nation. It also explicitly acknowledged the failure of big centralized structures to bring peace. The so-called Northern Recovery Area, which is made up of two 'states' - Somaliland and Puntland is leading in the implementation of the "bottom up approach."

It is also possible that Somalia could break up into a number of tribal republics following the example of Somaliland, which seceded in 1991. Somaliland's justification for secession was based on the historical fact that it was a British colony while the rest of the former Somali state was an Italian colony. Many Somalis question the validity of this argument.

The breakaway of Somaliland will undoubtedly encourage some other groups to do likewise. This could be a devastating option to choose because of the potential for disputes over land jurisdiction. Puntland is already involved in such a dispute with Somaliland and because of the Somali nomadic way of life the tribal habitats are areas of land with constantly changing frontiers. There are no tribal designated areas, and usually no clear tribal frontiers in the Somali territories. The notion of breaking up the country into tribal republics could well prove unworkable.

The regional state of Puntland may, however, be laying the foundations for the reconstitution of the Somali nation. Puntland was established in 1998 and was a major political development. It consists of five of the 18 regions that made up the Somali Republic. Unlike Somaliland, which had declared its intention to secede from the rest of the country, Puntland has the stated policy that it "does not believe in any form of secession or break-up of the Somali nation" and that the "unity, integrity and sovereignty of Somalia is inviolable". The majority of the Somali people support this fundamental principle of unity of the Somali territories. The Bay Zone in the south of the country has recently established another 'state' in the Bay and Bakol areas.

The international community should try to put the Somali issue in its proper historical perspective to understand the under-lying root causes of the Somali crises. Somalia is now experiencing a process of re-birth, constructing a new nation from scratch. This natural process will take time to crystallize and to become established. The actions of the international community have so far been directed at stopping or slowing down this evolutionary process by proposing unworkable political solutions to the successive crises. Many efforts have been devoted to the application of the wrong medicine, and very little to understanding the real problems. This is why a dozen reconciliation conferences have failed in the last 8 years. The 1992 UN intervention also failed. Djibouti is now calling for another one very soon, but this is not the answer.

The international community can only help if it will accept that the Somali crises have to be solved by the Somalis themselves. An evolutionary process should be left to take its natural course. A new Somalia has been taking shape for some years now, but interference by some of the regional powers in the country’s internal civil conflicts, together with the confused actions of the international community, are only serving to perpetuate the civil conflict.

During the last decade the public opinion in Somalia has evolved, Somalis have learned painfully the hard way that the system of governance that suits them the best is a devolved federal system. It is not something the ordinary people would want to be philosophical about, or wish to continuously dwell on its fine ideology, rather a simple feeling of long-term security guarantees. People's memory is still fresh with what can happen when a civil war breaks out and you happen to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. Somalis did not yet forget what has happened when many people found themselves in a "non-traditional" region of theirs, despite the strong feeling that it was actually theirs. People would like to be governed within their enclave and have a nationalistic common agenda at the same time. People would like to have their own feel good factor within the confines of their traditional areas in Somalia. People would like to make decisions closer to home and would greatly cherish to contribute to any national issue that will hold Somalia together. One might question how these conclusions have been reached when there is no sophisticated opinion polling system in Somalia? However, one would note that these ideas have formed strongly until it has been put in practice in large areas of Somalia, particularly in Puntland and in Somaliland though with different premises. The spirit of regionalism is also transparent from business practices as it is from rehabilitation trends of the people after the civil war.

What we have attained after Arta conference is a set of structures, which aims to return us to those dark days of centralized authority. Dark on intent and dark with content. The days when governmental structures were centralized in order to control the nation with firm hands. The days when you could not get a passport or obtain a visa until you travel to Mogadishu. The days when you could not import anything essential into the country unless you do it via Mogadishu port despite having the longest coastline in Africa. The days when you could not go to a university unless you have a home in Mogadishu or become stranded in Mogadishu suburbs. Some people within these structures could conceptualize the days when Somalia was nothing but Mogadishu, and when Mogadishu collapsed Somalia was nothing altogether and still struggles to be something. The parable seems to be on going with these people when they still imagine if Mogadishu is something again, Somalia will be something altogether again. The people who are spearheading these hauled structures from Djibouti, have graduated from nothing other that Siyad Barre's academy of dictatorship and control, and have even done post Siyad specialization in tribal cleansing and looting technology. What they have not done so far is to ever participate in any representative democratic forum or appreciate any self-governance on the grass roots level.

It is strange to be participating in any debate regarding the conference in Djibouti and its outcome. When such a debate starts and you hint any reservations you might have about the process, its principles and practices, you are confronted with questions like are you against peace in Somalia? It is a big and frightening question as there could be no sane person who will oppose peace in anywhere in the world let alone your own country. Even the media have picked up some headlines like "peace and stability at last". Like it has rained peace and stability in an upstream neighboring country to swiftly pour on us on a downstream level. In this instance, there are two issues, which are confused intentionally or unintentionally. The first is what has been set up in Arta Djibouti and the second is a lasting peace and a credible government in Somalia. The Somali people who gathered in Arta Djibouti have succeeded in appointing a parliament and electing a president however debatable the method and the process of that election might be, nevertheless that was the end result in Djibouti. It is also worth mentioning that there are many people as well as the sole existing and peaceful regional administrations that oppose the whole conference and its outcome.

What we have to achieve yet in Somalia is a lasting peace and a credible government in all over Somalia. Instead of declaring peace at last or asking whether someone is against peace in Somalia or not, wouldn't it be more appropriate if we dealt with the more relevant points and asked more appropriate questions such as; would this government bring peace to Somalia? On the other hand, will it be credible enough to bring all Somalis onboard? Wouldn't it be more relevant if we deliberated about whether we can trust the same people who shackled us with devastating tribal and hate policies for more than two decades? Wouldn’t it be more befitting if we thought about the system in which we handed those people to hit us again hard on where it hurts? Wouldn’t it be more applicable if we reason more about whether this government would work to return the looted properties to its rightful owners and how will it do that? Wouldn’t it be more equitable if we decide what to do about those who committed the crimes of genocide against Somali people and talked about whether it is worth to extend parliamentary amnesty to the people who committed those grievous crimes?

For two apparent reasons, it is difficult to imagine how we can get a credible government in all Somalia out of the current saga as well as from the same familiar faces. For the system in which it has been set up with, the tribal system, which is neither representative nor maintainable in the future. In addition, for the old faces who had everything to do with our misery and where we stand today. In a recent interview with Mr. Hassan by Al-Hayat (Arabic paper) reporter he was specifically asked why should the Somali people trust him when he loyally served under a dictatorial regime. The answer he gave did not give us any scrap of comfort but instead made us more dismal about our future being in the hands of these people. He blatantly said "the Somali people must trust, and they have already trusted me" he showed us how complacently he took our trust for granted. What he does not realize is that it will be incomprehensible for Kosovo-Albanians to be asked to trust anyone who loyally served under Slobodan Milosevic's government. Nor will it be understandable for Europeans to trust anyone who was in Hitler's cabinet. For that same reason it will be hard for the Somali people to trust a loyal lieutenant of Siyad Barre specially when he surrounded himself with former colleagues in crimes.

There has been a public relations campaign for Mr Hassan most of it by the UN information service in Somalia known as IRIN and by the BBC Somali service. It is clear why most of Somali people do not believe whatever public relations exercise these two services comes up in relation to Abdi Qassim Salad Hassan. Many Somalis are aware of the fact that the editor of IRIN in Somalia is non-other that Abdi Salad Hassan, Abdi Qassim's own brother. It is not surprising why most Somalis listen to UN's information service with contempt and regard it to be very amusing to hear what spin Mr Hassan can master for Mr. Hassan. Even more Somalis know about the fact that the chief editor of the BBC Somali service, Mr. Garad, is a close cousin of Mr. Hassan, so is the BBC's Somali section reporter from Mogadishu. The Somali people was also made aware of what kind of a man Mr. Garad is, he has even gone far enough to sack most of the experienced Somali radio journalists in the BBC's Somali section and substituted them with three close inexperienced cousins of his. A person who did not shy away to commit the most outrageous nepotism against informed Somali journalists should not be expected to impartially inform Somali public about his close cousin the "elected" president in Djibouti.

Despite the hard work of Mr. Hassan's brother and cousins, and despite the spins they have tried so hard to put on his image and presentation, "the president-elect" has frequently let himself down in the press. That close net media organizations around him must have got to his head when he somehow thought that he can get away with whatever contradicting statements he makes to the press on the first come first serve basis. We are getting mixed messages from the "president elect" in relation to how he will deal with the existing administrations, Puntland and Somaliland, and what system he will be governing the country with. The president elect seems to be amusing everybody who interviews him without much regard for any dismal contradictions his statements might make. He sometimes declares that he will use a dialogue in order to make his administration more inclusive, while, depending on the addressed person at that time, he also declares that he will use force to unite Somalia. He declares to the Somali people that he will rule the country with Islamic Shariah and that he does not want to be punished by Allah if he chooses to rule the country with a different system, while on the same rationale he declares to western journalists that he has absolutely nothing to do with Islamists and whatever he believes in as a person is totally different from what he will rule the country with. He concedes that Siyad Barre's government was a dictatorial regime, while on the same line he shows his delight to have loyally served under that regime.

All those statements cannot be right, and Mr. Hassan ought to distinguish which one of them is right and which one of them is wrong. He must tell us which one of those statements were a true conviction of his and which one of them was a joke. I am afraid that Mr. Hassan has to be told that he can not have it both ways, he is either to be using a dialogue or he is going to use force, or he is either going to introduce Shariah law or he isn't. He must courageously stand by the policies he heavily contributed to its making or he must denounce everything he has done in his life for that long years he remained a loyal lieutenant to Siyad Barre. He can't be using force and call that to be a dialogue, as he cannot be believing in the sovereignty of the people and call that to be the Shariah law or visa versa. He cannot be calling Siyad Barre's regime to be a dictatorial regime and solely exempt himself from their dark memory. He must at least have the decency to state what his convictions are, if there are any that is. He must state clearly whether he understands the wish of the Somali people to have a devolved federal system or the need for them to sustain and build upon the form of decentralization they have so far achieved.

The 'President' Elect has chosen Dr Ali Khalif Galayr as the 'Prime Minister'. For many this choice was another example of how absurd and far-removed this whole Djibouti Process is. The choice of the Prime Minister would probably not have changed much in terms of buying legitimacy for the Process in the eyes of many Somalis, but nevertheless is a bad PR, when the choice becomes somebody who is accused of robbing the Mareeray Sugar Factory of hundreds of thousands of US$ in early 1980's when he was the Director General of the production facilities. At the collapse of the Somali State in 1991, Dr Galayr was in the list of 'Most Wanted People' for the alleged infamous cash heist.

The Somali people's wishes to have a devolved federal system is a real one, it is the dream of the people to see life being possible in each one's territory. It is a dream that the people made it closer to reality in the few years in which they started to do it out of desperation. It is the cornerstone of security and stability in today's Somalia and Mr. Hassan must not be allowed to wreck those fundamental rights of the Somali people. While a lot of emphases have been made on the need to make a government regardless of the system it will operate with, it is sad that the central argument on what the people want have been missed in Djibouti conference. What has been done in Arta, Djibouti is an imposition of opinions without really looking down to the practicalities on the ground as well as the strong and genuine feeling of the people in their respective localities. In that sense it could only be described not less than a dictatorship of opinions, and that could only be the worst kind of dictatorship.

Almost hidden in the chorus of high-pitched voices rejoicing the recent election of a president for Somalia, there are some less optimistic aspects that have remained outside of the media focus. To raise doubts is a little bit like swearing in church; how can anyone seriously be against peace in Somalia? A country the suffering of which has prompted so much world-wide distress, so much aid and that has contributed to an entirely new form of peace-keeping labelled ‘humanitarian intervention’, surely it’s nothing more than academic hair-splitting to object to the peace believed to be under way. Now that this country that has been without a central government since 1991 finally has set up a parliament in neighbouring Djibouti and that parliament in turn has elected a president and now that vast amounts of Somalis eagerly await this president’s appointment of his first cabinet – this must mean that peace has finally come?

The objections do not primarily focus on the extraordinary format of the rise of this yet-to-be-appointed government. While there are ample reasons to question a ‘parliament’ with so many members living in exile and while one may wonder what’s in it for Djibouti that has lost valuable parts of its transit trade to a self-proclaimed independent part of Somalia, an independence now challenged by the very conference that Djibouti has initiated and hosted, let’s, at least temporarily, leave such issues aside.

The more substantial objection is instead that the current process is out of phase with the realities in Somalia. It could perhaps have been a good idea to assemble in Djibouti back in 1991, just after the former regime had been toppled. In fact the major political leaders did precisely that – twice – and they even elected a new president who became the first in a series of rival presidents that has since emerged. Admittedly it’s been a few years now since the last appointment of a president claiming to operate on the national level, but the point is that having someone named for that position is nothing new and it has not helped to solve anything in the past, just created new rivalries and more instability.

What is the kind of political landscape in which this president is going to operate? It is certainly not a uniform structure just lacking some key persons the appointment of which will mend the conflicts and make the Somali state re-emerge. On the contrary the conditions created by 10 years of statelessness are to a large extent irreversible. First of all two large territories of the former Somali republic have formed their own independent states with their own governments, parliaments and heads of state. The former British colony in the northwest of Somalia declared its secession already in 1991. While political leaders in Somaliland, as it now calls itself, may want to hold a door open for some form of future merger with the rest of the country, the popular support for independence is enormous. Slightly less determined to pursue independence, Somaliland’s eastern neighbour, calling itself the Puntland State of Somalia, was formally launched in 1998 but was preceded by a number of regional administrations. Somaliland and Puntland arguably comprise about a third of the Somali population and both governments have refused to play any role in the Djibouti process. They regard the appointment of a national level government as a direct threat against the stability that they have established locally. In the case of Puntland, the Djibouti conference has served as a forum for the internal opposition to the current leadership seeking to apply the nationalist rhetoric to their own, very local, power ambitions.

It is important to emphasise that Somaliland and Puntland, while perhaps the most stable ones, are not the only regional governments with a de facto control of more or less autonomous areas. It could be argued that the whole country consists of a patchwork of such locally formed polities of various sizes, with varying internal stability and with highly varied life spans. The type of leadership that these polities have is also increasingly based on local political histories involving commercial elites, militant Islamists, former politicians, traditional leaders, wealthy returnees and militia and military leaders. While the infamous ‘war lords’ of the early 1990’s are still around, and here and there form part of the local competition for power, the last five or six years have gradually seen their power diluted and their range of influence shrinking. In this process, that some has termed the radical localisation of Somali politics, the goal of restoring a national government has become reduced to an increasingly empty rhetoric, fashionable among some exiled intellectuals and, now and then, forming the theme for internationally sponsored conferences.

The point is that many of these small polities are doing fairly well. Or, more correctly, a good number of people with influence within these polities are doing fairly well. Rampant capitalism reigns and businessmen are always willing to at least consider exchanging some of their profits for protection of their investments, thus ensuring a small but steady trickle of ‘taxation’ into the hands of ‘politicians’ to allow investments in public services and increased political goodwill.

Thus an unholy alliance of business interests and political entrepreneurship forms a kind of centripetal force creating relative stability and a climate that allows the delivery of at least rudimentary social services. Yet the flip side of the coin is the centrifugal force in the shape of the system of clanship. The fragmentation of the state has its close parallel (some would say reason) in the fragmentation of clan identities. Clans are really tiny groups of people bound together by obligations to pay blood wealth and other forms of legal compensation. In times of peace such groups merge and large-scale kinship-based clans emerge. In times of war these clans fall apart, sometimes even the blood wealth groups have to split up. For the political life this means that trust – one of the most essential aspects of any society – becomes an increasingly scarce commodity. And as clans fragment the social basis for the tiny polities erode and that forces leaders to start all over again, on a smaller scale, narrowing the geographical scope and with a waning social catchment area. This is a good recipe for economic disaster. When a ‘state’ becomes a few blocks in the bombed-out former capital there is simply nothing left to fight over.

Somaliland and Puntland have been able, for different reasons, to manoeuvre themselves free from these disastrous developments. In Somaliland the armed struggle against the Siyad Barre regime from 1982 and onwards formed a point of departure for an impressive process of localised peace conferences that eventually embraced all groups in the former British colony and resulted in the decision to secede. This decision also gained impetus from the first Djibouti conference in 1991 where yet another southerner had been proclaimed president. Somalilanders felt that they had suffered under the patronage of southern rule for 20 years and were not willing to try a new such constellation. The reasons why Puntland has been able to avoid the southern fragmentation has much to do with the fierce battles fought against southern militias back in 1992. These battles (some count them as the bloodiest in the entire Somali civil war) forced the emergence of a series of attempts to establish regional and interregional administrations. The large stream of capital and migrants from the south to Puntland has also given the area a good number of social and economic reasons to stay clear of the muddle in the south.

The southern part of the country has had a rather different history that has produced a broad set of motivations to speed up the breakdown of political loyalties. It was the fierce battles in and around the capital Mogadishu that really marked the beginning of the full-scale civil war. The amassment of political and economic resources, not least by the UN and other agencies, to Mogadishu, unfortunately served to increase the economic basis for fission. The potential spoils on the national level were enormous, but in Mogadishu you could do rather well with much less.

Today the UN and most others have left. The harbour and airport are closed. Most of the essential agricultural resources are far inland. The main export outlets are in Somaliland and Puntland. The only safe way of getting an income is to set up yet another checkpoint, blocking off an even smaller area than before. And so the southern fragmentation continues. It is in that context that a ‘national conference’ comes in so handy. The political culture of Somalia has a built-in shortcut to overcome fragmentation and division: assign a common external enemy and you will pull together the many strands of a fragmented political reality. As Machiavellian as it may sound in it’s simplicity it formed an essential part of the toolbox that kept Somalia’s overthrown dictator Siyad Barre in power for more than 20 years. So who will play the role of enemy? The obvious choice throughout the past 10 years has been to appeal to ‘nationalism’ to and revive the nation-state rhetoric from the height of Somalis modernist era just around independence. In that light Somaliland’s secession and Puntland’s autonomy become indigestible disobediences that must be put straight.

There are few issues in the south that have created an equal amount of concerted opinion as the animosity expressed against the secession of Somaliland. Nearly every one of the twenty or so ‘peace agreements’ that southern factions have signed throughout the war starts off with the phrase “The unity of Somalia is sacred.” The implicit reference to Somaliland (that never took part in any of these conferences) couldn’t be made clearer. The fact that Somaliland’s economy has gradually improved and the political stability is admirable has not impressed many southerners. With the former capital in ruins and in a political climate characterised by increasing fission of even originally tiny fragments there is at least the common enemy Somaliland to bemoan. It is as if the declared secession was to blame for all the disasters that the south has suffered and while Puntland does not officially claim anything else than it’s willingness to be part of a future federal Somalia, it too is seen as a threat to the re-emergence of a united Somali Republic.

It is in this context that we should view the Djibouti conference, the parliament and the president it selected. It is in the possibility of confrontation between Puntland/Somaliland and the south that the real threats lie. And to be fair we must allow the thought that Djibouti has not invested in this huge conference out of unselfish interests in bringing about peace in the very distant southern Somalia. Djibouti is a barren desert that survives on generous French aid and the Ethiopian transit trade. Recently France has substantially reduced its support and a small but increasing share of the Ethiopian trade now goes through Somaliland instead. To make the point very clear one should also be aware that the part of Somaliland that borders on Djibouti comprises some excellent farming land.

So what is going to happen? Well, it has already started. The new president has gone to the south where a veritable cargo cult has exploded. Congratulatory telegrams from heads of state all over the world are mixed with local signs of appreciation like awarding the president with the gold medals for different sport accomplishments. This is now thought to be the decisive turning point that will reopen all the international checkbooks and see to that the stream of foreign aid comes back. Nothing of the sort is of course going to happen and it is at that point real danger emerges. When the celebrating crowds in the streets of Mogadishu realise that they’ve been let down this time, too, that will be the point when some really good strategies are needed. Given the backing of Djibouti it will be tempting for the new president to use the nationalist angle to maintain his momentum. One can foresee a number of different scenarios that all involve some sort of combination of Djibouti’s more obscure interests and the interest of Somalia’s most recent president in creating a larger polity than that offered by any of the southern fiefdoms for himself and his cabinet. It is probably only by very explicitly targeting the northern secessionists that the southern power base can expand. Put in slightly different words: the road to political success in the fragmented south is to attack the stable north.

A farfetched conspiracy theory? Maybe. But one must remember that the new president served in vital cabinet positions for Siyad Barre during more than a decade. Djibouti’s president is himself related to others in the same sphere of politicians. And key members of the parliament include people like the former military commander of Siyad Barre. One must also point out that an ‘attack’ in this case must not necessarily involve military means. There is enough harm to be done in diplomatic and aid circles to cause serious blows to both Puntland and Somaliland. The international actors in and around Somalia offer a number of potential allies for someone who expresses willingness to shoulder the task of putting a unified Somalia back on the track. The family of Nairobi-based UN organisations involved in Somalia – often internally fragmented in bitter fights over increasingly meagre resource flows – have a number of actors willing to put their weight behind a fresh political force in Somalia. In fact the most senior UN diplomat, David Stephen, has directed the entire Djibouti process. It is also an inauspicious sign that the Italian envoy to Somalia hurried to Djibouti to attend a human rights seminar with the newly appointed MPs. If it comes to a point where the UN, the EU and other organisations have to make a choice between working for something that purportedly could lead to a reunification of Somalia, or to go on working with increasingly minuscule local administrations, the choice will be rather easy. In fact, the UN aid coordinator Randolph Kent quickly pledged that the new government (although there is not one appointed yet) was going to have a tremendous impact on the work of aid organisations.

But the aid organisations are not the only international actors involved in Somalia. A number of other African countries also have vested interests in Somalia or play very high-profile roles in the politics of reinventing the country. Libya, to mention just one, has given financial support to every actor in the current conflict. Backing both Puntland and southern politicians, Khadaffi seems to have established future friends no matter how it all ends. However, even Khadaffi’s generous recent offers to the rival warlords in Mogadishu was not enough to buy the new president their support. Despite extensive meetings in Tripoli, Hussein Aydiid has simply declared that he recognises his new rival as another “local leader.”

Postponing the appointments for the cabinet remains the only trick for the president to ward off the increasing sphere of critics at home and abroad. The idea is of course to make everyone believe that there eventually will be a position for them. This may do the trick for a while. But with some of more famous crooks of the Siyad Barre era reported to be on their way back to take up positions in the new government, even the more insignificant of warlords appear to feel that there is more to lose by joining than by simply resisting. The many outlandish figures that have been mentioned as possible premiers of the coming government, include a man who in 1991 run off in a private airplane with a good part of the state’s finances in his pockets. The more serious political observers in Mogadishu, like the Dr Ismail Jum’ale Human Rights Centre, has throughout the Djibouti process argued a truth commission is needed in Somalia and that persons known to have committed war crimes and other criminal offences should be blocked from participation in the political process.

So will there be peace in Somalia now? The question answers itself. Is it good policy to establish an exiled government whose only chance of success lies in attacking those parts of the country that, through their own efforts, have reached stability? Whose interests are really served by this? Less then a year ago, the word of the day among the international organisations was the so-called building bloc approach to Somalia. It was widely argued that the only road ahead was for other parts of Somalia to follow the examples set by Somaliland and Puntland. With what first appeared to be a quick-fix solution within reach, those plans were buried. However, the first telltale effects of the Djibouti process are already at hand: Trading in the Mogadishu area has significantly decreased and food prices has surged unexpectedly for the season. Exiled Somalis who normally pay regular visits to the country have cancelled their trips. Even more serious are the bands of ex-militias who now room the city centre demanding to be employed by the police force the president has declared he is going to set up.

The short answer to the peace question is no. But unfortunately the more serious issue that observers all over the world now confront is that of limitation of damages. Will the effects of this latest disastrous move in Somalia simply go away as the name of the “president” becomes forgotten in the coming months? It is still too early to say because with the international stakes raised high and a number of bureaucratic carriers deeply invested it remains uncertain whether peace will prevail.